CHERI: A Hybrid Capability-System Architecture for Scalable Software Compartmentalization
Abstract—CHERI extends a conventional RISC Instruction-Set Architecture, compiler, and operating system to support fine-grained, capability-based memory protection to mitigate memory-related vulnerabilities in C-language TCBs. We describe how CHERI capabilities can also underpin a hardware-software object-capability model for application compartmentalization that can mitigate broader classes of attack. Prototyped as an extension to the open-source 64-bit BERI RISC FPGA soft-core processor, FreeBSD operating system, and LLVM compiler, we demonstrate multiple orders-of-magnitude improvement inscalability, simplified programmability, and resulting tangible security benefits as compared to compartmentalization based on pure Memory-Management Unit (MMU) designs. We evaluate incrementally deployable CHERI-based compartmentalization using several real-world UNIX libraries and applications.
How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?
by Richard Stallman
"For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong." — H. L. Mencken
A bunch of technomancers in the fediverse. Keep it fairly clean please. This arcology is for all who wash up upon it's digital shore.